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CROATIA V. SLOVENIA: THE DEFILED PROCEEDINGS
By
Matko Ilić*
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitrator impartiality and procedural fairness are expected in international
arbitration. However, international arbitration simultaneously serves other goals, including
the recognition and enforceability of awards that are more difficult to attain in other types
of dispute resolution. When parties sign an arbitration agreement, they undergo a binding
dispute resolution process that leads to a binding award. However, Croatia v. Slovenia, a
unique case, highlighted the conflict between the binding nature of the award and the
integrity of arbitral proceedings.1 When a party engages in ex parte communications with
a party-appointed arbitrator, is the arbitral process necessarily threatened? The article will
discuss the background of the controversy between Croatia and Slovenia regarding the Bay
of Piran/Savudrija, the Partial Award issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the
Tribunal’s rationale, and the expectation of the parties to settle their disputes in good faith
and in accordance with arbitrator impartiality, independence, and procedural fairness.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY: THE BAY OF PIRAN/SAVUDRIJA
The current dispute between Croatia and Slovenia concerns the maritime border
controversy along the Bay of Savudrija, as named in Croatia, or the Bay of Piran, as named
in Slovenia (“the Bay”).2 Well known for its Sečovlje saltpans and fishing locations, the
Bay and the land between the Bay and Istria underwent border changes during and after
the Second World War.3 Following the enactment of the Treaty of Osimo in 1975 and
Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991, border
controversies between the two nations arose.4 These controversies centered on both the
*
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Croatia v. Slovenia, PCA Case Repository 2012-04, Partial Award, P 16 (Perm. Ct. Arb. June 30, 2016).

2

Drago Kladnik & Primož Pipan, Bay of Piran or Bay of Savudrija? An Example of Problematic Treatment
of Geographical Names, 48 ACTA GEOGRAPHICA SLOVENICA 57, 59 (2008).
3

See generally Primož Pipan, Border Dispute Between Croatia and Slovenia Along the Lower Reaches of
the Dragonja River, 48 ACTA GEOGRAPHICA SLOVENICA 331, 336-39 (2008) (describing in detail the border
shift between Slovenia and Croatia before and after the formation of the Free Territory of Trieste in 1947);
Giuseppe Cataldi, Prospects for the Judicial Settlement of the Dispute Between Croatia and Slovenia Over
Piran Bay, in INT’L CTS. AND THE DEV. OF INT’L LAW 257, 257 (explaining the effect of the 1975 Treaty of
Osimo between Italy and Yugoslavia, which applied the principle of equidistance to alter the 1947 borders
surrounding the Bay).
4

Pipan, supra note 3, at 333.

location of several villages near the Dragonja River and the demarcation line of the Bay.5
In 2001, the Croatian and Slovenian governments tried to resolve the border dispute along
the Bay and the villages near the Dragonja River by planning out the Drnovšek-Račan
treaty.6 Under this agreement, both parties would set new territorial and high sea
coordinates along their sea surface as well as create joint bodies that would demarcate the
lines of the state borders.7 However, in 2002, Croatia failed to sign the pact, which would
have positioned the new border at the bed of the Dragonja River.8 The following nine years
were characterized as times of constant disagreement regarding the proposed borders of
the Bay.9
On May 1, 2004, Slovenia joined the European Union, which shaped future Bay
discussions with its neighbor, Croatia.10 Namely, Slovenia vetoed Croatia’s EU-accession
negotiations due to the maritime dispute.11 To move forward with the European Union
accession talks, Croatia agreed to arbitrate the border dispute with Slovenia.12 The
resolution of the maritime issues was a prerequisite for Croatia’s admission to the European
Union under Article 9 of the Arbitration Agreement.13 An agreement to arbitrate the

5

Pipan, supra note 3, at 333 (stating the impact of the border dispute on three villages near the Bay: MliniŠkrile, Bužini, and Škodelin).
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Treaty Between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia on the Common State Border, Croat.Slovn., July 20, 2001.
7
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Pipan, supra note 3, at 343 (describing the Drnovšek-Račan agreement, which was named after the Prime
Ministers of Slovenia and Croatia, respectively, where the three villages mentioned in note 3 “were to become
Croatian,” should have Croatia accepted the agreement); see also Matej Avbelj & Jernej Letnar Černič, The
Conundrum of the Piran Bay: Slovenia v. Croatia – The Case of Maritime Delimitation, 5 U. PA. J. INT’L L.
& POL’Y 1, 11 (presenting the planned maritime border, as proposed by the delimitation agreement; Croatia
has not ratified the proposal).
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Cataldi, supra note 3, at 258 (summarizing the Slovenian argument, in which: (a) Slovenia was a
“geographically disadvantaged State” as a result of its landlocked status and thus demanded an “Exclusive
Economic Zone”; and (b) the Bay was a “historical bay,” which would grant Slovenia a right of direct junction
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Cataldi, supra note 3, at 259 (“[I]t is encouraging to note that membership of the Union . . . is a fundamental
element in bringing together two nations and encouraging a positive solution to an ongoing dispute.”).
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2009),
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border-lines of the Bay would fulfill the requirement, as suggested in draft agreements by
the European Commissioner for Enlargement.14 The negotiations for Croatia’s accession
were on standby until a Slovenian referendum on June 5, 2010 ended its reservations on
several negotiating matters.15 Slovenia permitted Croatia’s entry to the EU, provided that
Croatia resolved the maritime dispute with Slovenia via state-to-state arbitration.16
Ultimately, both parties agreed to initiate arbitration, and they signed the Arbitration
Agreement in Stockholm on November 4, 2009.17 Under the Arbitration Agreement, both
parties promised to settle their disputes “peace[fully]” and “in the spirit of good
neighbourly relations” in accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.18
A. The Preparation and Purpose of the Arbitration Agreement
The arbitral proceedings began on April 13, 2012, and the parties agreed to apply
the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two
States.19 The seat of the arbitration was Brussels, Belgium.20 In accordance with the
agreement, on January 17, 2012, the counsel for Slovenia and Croatia selected Judge
Gilbert Guillaume of France, Prof. Vaughan Lowe QC of England, and Judge Bruno
Simma of Germany as arbitrators.21 Two weeks after the selection of the arbitrators,

government-of-croatia-and-the-government-of-slovenia-04112009.pdf [hereinafter Arbitration Agreement];
see also Cataldi, supra note 3, at 259.
14

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 3.
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Phil Cain, Croatia Poised for EU Membership Following Slovenian Border Dispute Referendum, THE
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/slovenia/7807200/Croatia-poised-for-EUmembership-following-Slovenian-border-dispute-referendum.html.
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Id.

17

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 1-2.

Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 4; see also U.N. Charter art. 33, ¶ 1 (“The parties to any
dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
shall, first of all, seek a solution by . . . arbitration . . . or other peaceful means of their own choice.”); Cataldi,
supra note 3, at 259.
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Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 4; Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating
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available
at
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Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 6(7).
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Case View: Arbitration Between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, PERMANENT COURT

OF ARBITRATION, https://pcacases.com/web/view/3.

Slovenia selected Dr. Jernej Sekolec while Croatia chose Prof. Budislav Vukas as partyappointed arbitrators.22
After the selection of the arbitrators, both parties saw the arbitral proceedings as
important in settling the long-fought border battle.23 Dr. Vesna Pusić, the Croatian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, praised the task before the Arbitral Tribunal and described the
upcoming award as “a beacon for international law.”24 On the Slovenian side, Mr. Karl
Erjavec, the Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed the need for access to the High
Sea, which the Minister characterized as a “vital interest” for Slovenia.25 Both parties listed
the main disputes in issue under Article 3(1) of the Arbitration Agreement, including “the
course of the maritime and land boundary,” “Slovenia’s junction to the High Sea,” and “the
regime for the use of relevant maritime areas.”26
Citing Article 4(a) of the Arbitration Agreement’s “Applicable Law,” the counsel
for Croatia requested the Tribunal to first apply “the rules and principles of international
law,” including Article 15 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS),
so that the territorial borders would lie in accordance with the boundary at the time of both
nations’ independence from Yugoslavia in 1991.27 However, the Slovenian counsel,
interested primarily in the junction to the High Sea, pointed instead to Article 4(b), in which
the finalization of the border would be dependent on “international law, equity and the
principle of good neighbourly relations in order to achieve a fair and just result.”28
B. The Ex Parte Communications
Despite the steadfast assurances of Slovenia and Croatia in agreeing to settle their
disputes through the good faith application of international law, evidence emerged that
Slovenia violated the Arbitration Agreement by engaging in ex parte communications with

22

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 4 (complying with art. 2, ¶ 2 of the Arbitration Agreement).
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See Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Conclusion of Hearing in the Arbitration Between the
Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia (June 17, 2014), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/241
[hereinafter Press Release June 2014].
See id. (“[Dr. Pusić] emphasized the importance that Croatia and the Croatian people attach to these
proceedings.”).
24
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Id.
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Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 3(1).
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Id. at art. 4(a); Press Release June 2014, supra note 23, at 1-2.
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Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 4(b) (emphasis added); Press Release June 2014, supra note
23, at 3; see also Cataldi, supra note 3, at 266 (“Common sense can and must guide the Tribunal. If this is
done, . . . it will have provided a successful solution to a controversy . . . without neglecting political aspects
and principles of equity.”) (emphasis added).

its party-appointed arbitrator on July 22, 2015.29 First, the Serbian newspaper Newsweek
revealed leaked transcripts of conversations between Slovenia’s party-appointed arbitrator,
Dr. Sekolec, and Ms. Simona Drenik, the Legal Adviser and Agent for Slovenia, which
were allegedly recorded on November 15, 2014, and January 11, 2015.30 In addition, the
Croatian newspaper Večernji published evidence of the same ex parte communications,
which evidenced that Slovenia violated the arbitral agreement.31 According to the
transcript, the Slovenian agent and arbitrator discussed the proposed delimitation of the
Croatian-Slovenian boundary lines.32 The evidence also showed that Ms. Drenik proposed
a strategy on how to influence the arbitrators so that they rule in favor of Slovenia.33 Next,
Dr. Sekolec assigned Ms. Drenik the task of preparing effectivités for the arbitration, and
the Slovenian arbitrator proposed to create a computer file with Ms. Drenik’s cadaster
documents, which left an impression that Dr. Sekolec was the original author.34 In response

29

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 6, 16 (citing Article 9.1 of the Terms of Appointment, which stated
that “[t]he Parties shall not engage in any oral or written communications with any member of the Arbitral
Tribunal ex parte in connection with the subject matter of the arbitration or any procedural issues that are
related to the proceedings.”).
30

Id.; Poslušajte Audio-Zapis Kako Slovenci Preotimaju Hrvatima Piranski Zaliv [Listen to the Audio
Recording as to How the Slovenes are Seizing the Bay of Piran from the Croats], NEWSWEEK (July 22, 2015,
3:26 PM), http://www.newsweek.rs/region/53276-njuzvik-ekskluzivno-otkriva-poslusajte-audio-zapiskako-slovneci-preotimaju-hrvatima-piranski-zaliv-video.html (Serb.).
Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 6, 16; Alison Ross, “Poisoned Waters”: Croatia’s Stance on the
Sekolec
Scandal,
10
GLOBAL
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REV.
15
(Aug.
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2015),
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1034698/“poisoned-waters”-croatia’s-stance-on-the-sekolecscandal; Sandra Veljković, Donosimo Audiosnimku Razgovora Arbitra i Slovenske Predstavnice [We Bring
the Audio Recording of the Conversation Between the Arbitrator and the Slovenian Representative],
VEČERNJI LIST (July 22, 2015, 3:33 PM), http://www.vecernji.hr/nagradjeni_autori/ekskluzivno-donosimorazgovor-arbitra-i-slovenske-strane-poslusajte-snimke-1015908 (Croat.).
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(2015),
http://www.mvep.hr/files/file/dokumenti/arbitraza/hr/150820-excerpts-from-recordings-between-drsekolec-and-mr-drenik-14082015.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Excerpts from Recordings].
Excerpts from Recordings, supra note 32, at 2 (providing that Dr. Sekolec said, “When [Guillaume and I]
had coffee break, Guillaume came to me and said, between us, in four eyes, ‘you are pushing very hard, but
you know, Croatia…’ He said, ‘you got what you needed in the sea.’”), 12 (according to Ms. Drenik, “[Y]ou
(Sekolec) give [Simma] one or two (murmur), say, OK, you know ‘I looked at this, so you know, I think…’
Not that you would give him 500 arguments. But you say ‘I think, look at this...’ . . . Maybe he will then
present it, but if you present it, he will look at it, Guillaume I mean. But if Simma says ‘Oh, it seems to me,
we could look at this again.’”).
33

Id.; Effectivités, ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2009) (“[E]ffectivités are
acts by a State relevant to a claim of title to territory by occupation or prescription; the factual elements that
demonstrate the exercise of governmental authority in a territory.”).
34

to the revealed transcripts, Dr. Sekolec resigned from his position as party-appointed
arbitrator on July 23, 2015.35
After evidence of Slovenia’s ex parte communications was revealed, Croatia
highlighted the communication during arbitral proceedings.36 Describing the event as an
“apparent collusion” between the Slovenian parties and Dr. Sekolec, the Croatian counsel
cited Article 9.1 of the Terms of Appointment, which forbade ex parte communications.37
Croatia described the incident as a “fundamental breach of professional ethics and
dishonesty that . . . violat[ed] . . . fundamental due process,” thus depicting the entire
arbitration process as “tainted.”38 By citing Article 60(1) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), which allows parties to rescind “treat[ies]” when
a “material breach of a bilateral treaty” has occurred, the Croatian Parliament unanimously
and unilaterally revoked the Arbitration Agreement on July 29, 2015.39 Despite recognizing
that Ms. Drenik was engaged in ex parte communications, Slovenia disagreed with Croatia
that the violation was a “material breach” of the Arbitration Agreement; namely, a
“material breach” had to act as “a gross infringement of an essential provision.”40
C. Reactions to the Ex Parte Communications
1. Croatia’s Reactions
Collectively, the Croatian counsel expressed disapproval with the close
communications between Dr. Sekolec and Ms. Drenik and their effect on the arbitral

35

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 16; Ross, supra note 31, at 9.

36

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 16.

37

Id.

Id. at 16-17 (“The communications appear to reveal . . . [the disclosure of] critical elements of the Arbitral
Tribunal’s deliberations to Slovenia’s Agent. . . .”).
38

39

See id. at 18; see also Arbitration Row May Hurt Zagreb More than Ljubljana, OXFORD ANALYTICA DAILY
BRIEF
SERVICE
(July
30,
2015),
http://search.proquest.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/docview/1700147308?pqorigsite=summon&accountid=13158; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60(1), opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties
entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in
whole or in part.”) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
40

Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Slovenia Demands Continuation of Arbitration Proceedings
(Aug. 19, 2015), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1403 [hereinafter Press Release August 2015]; see
Vienna Convention, supra note 39, at art. 60(1); Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 34.

proceedings.41 However, as Croatia emphasized, the resignations of the breaching parties
and the reconstitution of the Tribunal could not “begin to address the gravity of the
situation,” which displayed Croatia’s hesitance with any further involvement with the
arbitration.42 Furthermore, Croatia wrote a letter to the arbitrators on July 24, 2015, and
elaborated on the “irreparable harm” caused by the ex parte discussions:
The communications appear to reveal that Arbitrator Sekolec inter alia
disclosed critical elements of the Arbitral Tribunal’s deliberations to
Slovenia’s Agent; advised her on the issues on which he believed the
Tribunal was inclined to rule in Slovenia’s favour, and on which issues it
was not so inclined; requested that Ms. Drenik provide him with arguments
and “facts” not already in the record so that he could use them in his
discussions with other members of the Arbitral Tribunal as his own;
conspired with Ms. Drenik to assure that the other members of the Tribunal
would not know their true source; communicated these arguments and
“facts” to the other members of the Tribunal on the basis that they were his
own.43
In Croatia’s view, Dr. Sekolec’s “numerous” discussions with the members of the
Tribunal and the PCA in a period of thirteen months led to a great likelihood that previously
unadmitted evidence would either end up in possession of the arbitrators or would affect
the arbitrators’ decision-making process without Croatia’s knowledge.44 Dr. Pusić
previously echoed these concerns in the beginning of 2015, in which Mr. Erjavec had
allegedly received and publicized confidential information regarding the arbitration.45
Erjavec’s reports to the Slovenian media were released on January 7, 2015, April 22, 2015,
and June 26, 2015.46 Thus, Croatia feared that Slovenia possessed “an additional channel
of communications” with the Arbitral Tribunal, and the past conversations with the

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 16 (“[T]he most fundamental principles of procedural fairness, due
process, impartiality and integrity of the arbitral process have been systematically and gravely violated. . .
.”).
41

42

See id.

43

Id.

See id. at 17; Ross, supra note 31, at 6, 8 (referring to Croatia’s lack of knowledge regarding the precise
extent in which the ex parte discussions had shaped the thought process of the arbitrators and the entire
arbitration, as commented by Zoran Milanović, the then-Prime Minister of Croatia).
44

45

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 5-6; Ross, supra note 31, at 7, 10 (according to the Slovenian
Parliament on February 2, 2013, Slovenia would have treated the Tribunal’s decision as ultra vires if Slovenia
did not obtain access to the High Sea).
46

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 5-6.

Slovenian media strengthened Croatia’s stance towards rescinding the Arbitration
Agreement.47
On July 30, 2015, the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed Croatia’s
decision to end any further participation in the arbitral proceedings, remarking that
Slovenia had materially breached the Arbitration Agreement, according to Article 60(1)
and (3) of the Vienna Convention and Articles 6 and 10 of the Arbitration Agreement.48 In
particular, the Ministry regarded the ex parte violations and sharing of unadmitted evidence
as “unlawful” and “unethical,” such that the damage inflicted upon the arbitration was
“irreparable.”49 Quoting the Vienna Convention and the Arbitration Agreement, the
Ministry explained that the illegal communications among the Slovenian parties rendered
the “object or purpose” of the Arbitration Agreement impossible to fulfill.50 Since Croatia
could not continue the proceedings in good faith, the Ministry felt justified to terminate the
Arbitration Agreement.51
2. Slovenia’s Reactions
Although Slovenia conceded that the ex parte communications between Sekolec
and Drenik violated Article 9(1) of the Terms of Appointment, the counsel did not agree
with Croatia’s assertion that the Arbitral Tribunal was obliged to terminate the Arbitration
Agreement.52 First, by citing Victor Pey Casado v. Chile, Slovenia downplayed the
significance of ex parte violations regarding the continuation of the arbitral proceedings.53
47

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 6; Ross, supra note 31, at 7.

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 18; Vienna Convention, supra note 39, at art. 60(1) (“A material
breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for
terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.”), art. 60(3) (“A material breach of a
treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in: (a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present
Convention; or (b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of
the treaty.”), art. 65(3) (referring both parties to “a solution” in accordance with Article 33 of the United
Nations Charter); Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 6(2) (referring to the violation of the Optional
Rules of the PCA), art. 10 (“Both Parties refrain from any action or statement which might intensify the
dispute or jeopardize the work of the Arbitral Tribunal.”).
48

49

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 18.

50

Id.; Ross, supra note 31, at 8.

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 23 (“[S]uch an award, if rendered, ‘could never be implemented, or
enforced.’”).
51

See id. at 29 (citing Victor Pey Casado and Foundation “Presidente Allende” v. Republic of Chile, ICSID
Case No. ARB/98/2, Award of 8 May 2008, ¶¶ 34-43); Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 3(4)
(referring to the Arbitral Tribunal’s kompetenz-kompetenz, in which “[t]he Arbitral Tribunal has the power
to interpret the present Agreement”); PCA Optional Rules, supra note 19, at art. 21 (explaining the
kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine).
52

53

Ross, supra note 31, at 11; see, e.g. V.V. Veeder, The Historical Keystone to International Arbitration:
The Party-Appointed Arbitrator – from Miami to Geneva, 107 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 387, 390-401 (2013)

In Victor Pey Casado, the Claimant requested that Mr. Rezek, a party-appointed arbitrator,
resign due to “improperly admitt[ing]” a draft on the tribunal’s jurisdictional decision,
which pointed to a “loss of confidence” in the arbitrator.54 Significantly, only the party that
appointed Rezek gained access to the copy of the decision.55 The arbitral proceedings
continued after the resignation and replacement of Rezek.56 Therefore, by citing Victor Pey
Casado, Slovenia attempted to show that its arbitral proceedings with Croatia could
continue as planned, despite any arbitrator bias.57
After hearing Slovenia’s argument, the Arbitral Tribunal responded.58 Specifically,
to treat the “non-material” breach, as Slovenia described it, the Arbitral Tribunal replaced
Sekolec and restarted the arbitral proceedings de novo.59 In addition, the Slovenian counsel
replaced Drenik as Agent.60 After the changes were made, Slovenia argued that the
Tribunal could perform its task as mandated by the Arbitration Agreement, and contrary to
Croatia’s claim, the arbitral disputes did not become impossible to resolve as a result of the
allegedly “irremediable corruption of the record of the proceedings.”61 Slovenia argued
that arbitration could be salvaged under the Tribunal’s authority.62 In support of its
argument, Slovenia cited an I.C.J. Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia and Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua.63 In its opinion, the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) stated

(discussing the “Alabama arbitration” in 1872 between American and British parties, in which the arbitrators
were involved in lengthy, yet open discussions with the members of counsel).
54

Victor Pey Casado, ¶¶ 34-43.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 36.

59

Id. at 46.

60

Id. at 7-8, 30 (applying Article 37 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally
Wrongful Acts, which accepted “a declaration of wrongfulness” for non-material breaches, an act that
Slovenia performed, selecting H.E. Mr. Ronny Abraham, the former I.C.J. president, as Slovenia’s new partyappointed arbitrator on July 28, 2015, and selecting, as per Slovenia’s request, new party-appointed
arbitrators, such as H.E. Mr. Rolf Einar Fife of Norway and Prof. Nicolas Michel of Switzerland, who
replaced Prof. Vukas of Croatia).
See id. at 29 (“This arbitration can and should continue to its conclusion, and can do so.”); see Ross, supra
note 31, at 13 (remarking that “the scandal would be more serious if [the arbitration] involved one of the
three members of the tribunal not appointed by the two states”).
61

62

63

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 29.

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, 47, ¶¶ 94-95 (June

that ex parte communications only make an arbitral dispute impossible to resolve when
such communications render the “object and purpose of the treaty” impossible to
complete.64 Here, Slovenia argued, Croatia did not fulfill its burden of proof that the ex
parte communications were a material breach of the Arbitration Agreement.65
Next, despite Croatia’s intended absence from future arbitral meetings, Slovenia
claimed that the Arbitral Tribunal could continue the proceedings in accordance with
Article 28(2) of the PCA Optional Rules.66 If Croatia were to successfully “delay” the
proceedings by abstaining from future gatherings, arbitration would then lose its
expeditious character.67 According to Slovenia, the losing side of arbitral proceedings
would often attempt to “frustrate an arbitration agreement” by unilaterally withdrawing
from arbitration.68
Third, Slovenia contended that Croatia’s accession to the European Union was a
“quid pro quo of the Parties’ agreement,” which permitted the Slovenian party to resolve
all disputes revolving around the Bay and the territorial borders through state-to-state
arbitration.69 Thus, Slovenia argued that Croatia could not terminate the Arbitration
Agreement, especially since the nation “has irrevocably benefitted” as a new European
Union member.70 In support of its argument, Slovenia cited the Fisheries Jurisdiction case
to show that once a party vested the decision-making powers in an arbitrator, as Croatia
did by joining the European Union, the party could not behave as if the agreement to
arbitrate did not exist.71 Since the Arbitration Agreement sought to settle the border dispute
between the two nations, Slovenia claimed that Croatia could not obstruct the direction of
the arbitral proceedings.72
Fourth, to counter Croatia’s reliance on the Vienna Convention, Slovenia
considered Articles 60(4) and 42(2) of the Convention, which permit the nullification of a

21); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
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treaty only through “the provisions of the treaty.”73 The Vienna Convention could render
the Arbitration Agreement null and void if no “prejudice” to the Arbitration Agreement
would result from the action.74 Articles 60(4) and 65(4), in conjunction with rulings from
the I.C.J., support the position that the Vienna Convention cannot alter any existing
obligations between two arbitrating parties. Thus, Slovenia contended that the Vienna
Convention does not justify the unilateral rescission of the agreement to arbitrate.75
Lastly, in reaction to Croatia’s past concerns that the Slovenian government had
access to confidential information of the arbitral proceedings and illicitly persuaded the
other members of the Tribunal, Slovenia claimed that Croatia misinterpreted Erjavec’s
comments to the Slovenian media.76 In addition, Slovenia contended that Sekolec and
Drenik shared only two documents, which were already disclosed to Croatia.77 Members
of the Tribunal, Slovenia claimed, may discuss the case with each other without any
violation of ex parte communications, and such practice is “common and appropriate as
part of a tribunal’s deliberations.”78 Thus, Slovenia claimed that the ex parte
communications did not render the arbitral proceedings impossible to fulfill, and Croatia
could not end its participation in the arbitration, according to Slovenia.79
3. Partial Award and Rationale
After the reconstituted Arbitral Tribunal held a hearing on March 17, 2016, the
Tribunal issued the Partial Award on June 30, 2016 to explain the ex parte issue.80 The
Tribunal decided that: (1) the Slovenian ex parte communications violated the Arbitration
73
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(Feb. 2); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Rwanda), Provisional Measures, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 219, 246, ¶ 75 (July 19).
75

76

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 6, 13.

77

See id. at 31.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 33-34.

80

Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Conclusion of Hearing in the Arbitration between the
Republic
of
Croatia
and
the
Republic
of
Slovenia
(Mar.
18,
2016),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1604 (following Croatia’s note verbale from July 30, 2015, the
Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs concluded that the Arbitration Agreement was terminated
and that Croatia would not be taking further part in the proceedings); Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 89.

Agreement; (2) contrary to Croatia’s contention, the Tribunal disagreed that the Arbitration
Agreement was rendered null and void; (3) “the arbitral proceedings pursuant to the
Arbitration Agreement [would] continue,” (4) the Tribunal “[would] determine the further
procedural steps” of the proceedings; and (5) the Tribunal would decide on questions of
cost after the issuance of the Final Award.81 Although Slovenia violated the Arbitration
Agreement, the Tribunal declared that the breach would not “affect the Tribunal’s ability,
in its current composition, to render a final award independently and impartially.”82 Despite
the Partial Award, Croatia continues to deny the applicability of the Arbitration
Agreement.83
The Tribunal explained the rationale for the Partial Award in detail.84 First, citing
Article 28 of the PCA Optional Rules, the Tribunal held that Croatia was not permitted to
unilaterally end the arbitral proceedings; instead, the arbitrators possessed kompetenzkompetenz to decide whether an agreement to arbitrate existed and whether the matter in
dispute was arbitrable, not Croatia.85 Next, the Tribunal held that the reconstruction of the
Tribunal had no effect on the Final Award, emphasizing that Sekolec did not share
81
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emphasizing that Croatia is no longer a party to the arbitral proceedings); Caroline Simson, Croatia-Slovenia
Territorial Row Survives Arbitrator Contract, LAW360 (June 30, 2016, 5:34 PM),
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See id. at 37-41 (citing The Walfish Bay Boundary Case (Ger./ Gr. Brit.), Award of May 23, 1911, R.I.A.A.
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previously unadmitted information with the arbitrators and that the procedural
disadvantage to Croatia from the ex parte communications was minor, if not nonexistent.86
Thus, the Tribunal believed that there remained no “obstacle to the continuation of the
proceedings,” and the hearings resumed on April 26, 2017.87
Although the Tribunal found that the arbitration could continue without prejudice
to Croatia, the panel noted that if “any hesitation” as to the ability of the arbitrators to
resolve the parties’ dispute surrounded the atmosphere of the proceedings, “[the Tribunal]
would conclude that the proceedings must be terminated.”88 No such hesitation existed in
the Tribunal’s eyes.89 Namely, the Tribunal would focus on “remedial action[s]” such as
“reopening” the submission of evidence and other facts, which would stabilize the
“procedural balance between the Parties” and eliminate further hesitation.90
III.

IMPARTIALITY AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ARBITRATION

Although the Tribunal held that Croatia could not unilaterally rescind the
Arbitration Agreement, the Partial Award afforded minimal consideration to the
importance of impartiality, independence, procedural fairness, and good faith in an arbitral
setting.91 This is evidenced through examining the fundamental principles of arbitration
and how the tribunal considered arbitral impartiality and procedural fairness in rendering
its award. When parties choose to settle their disputes through arbitration, each party
surrenders its own ability to litigate all relevant matters in court.92 Despite the trade-off,
arbitration remains an “adjudicatory” action, where a tribunal, just like a court, makes
decisions on an “impartial” and “independent” basis.93 The tribunal’s informed
adjudicatory decisions are determined primarily by the parties’ legal arguments and the
evidence they put forth in support of their arguments; however, ex parte communications
without the other party’s presence counteracts the principles of impartiality and procedural
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fairness.94 As the article describes in detail, arbitrator impartiality and procedural fairness
play important roles in arbitration.
1. Impartiality in the Arbitration Agreement and the Croatian-Slovenian
National Arbitration Laws
First, the Arbitration Agreement between and the national arbitration laws of
Slovenia and Croatia identify arbitrator impartiality and independence as integral qualities
of a proper arbitral proceeding.95 According to Article Four of the Arbitration Agreement,
the Arbitral Tribunal was given the task to delineate the bounds of the Bay in accordance
with “international law, equity, and the principle of good neighborly relations in order to
achieve a fair and just result.”96 In the spirit of the Agreement, the Tribunal described the
interests of both parties as “vital,” and if the arbitral proceedings could not reach the goal
of a “fair and just result,” the Tribunal could rescind the Arbitration Agreement.97
Consequently, arbitral impartiality, an integral part of “procedural fairness,” falls under the
purpose of Article Four and plays a major role in the structure of the arbitral proceedings.98
Both Laws on Arbitration for Slovenia and Croatia highlight the provisions on arbitral
impartiality, the requirement of disclosure, and equal treatment of the parties.99 Lastly, the
nearly verbatim provisions of both nations’ arbitration acts allow the arbitral tribunal to
terminate the arbitration agreement if the proceedings become “impossible.”100 For
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instance, impossibility could occur when the object or purpose of the arbitration agreement
is defeated.101
2. Impartiality in the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules
Second, Article Ten of the Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for
Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States, which is very similar to the national arbitration
laws of Slovenia and Croatia, requires arbitrator impartiality and independence.102 A reason
for impartiality is that the arbitrators must “provide fair and effective procedures for
peaceful resolution of disputes.”103 Thus, if the conduct of arbitration leans prejudicially
towards one side during ex parte communications, the fair and effective procedures in the
Optional Rules would become compromised.104 Similarly, the arbitral tribunal must
provide each party an equal chance to present its arguments.105 In conjunction with Article
34(2), if the continuation of the arbitral proceedings would become “unnecessary” or
“impossible,” the tribunal could rescind the arbitration agreement.106 Thus, impartial and
independent arbitrators and procedural fairness are important aspects of the arbitration
agreement, which are reflected in the Optional Rules of the PCA and the national
arbitration laws.107
3. Authors’ Perspectives on Impartiality and Fairness
Third, many scholars note the importance of arbitral impartiality and procedural
fairness, which are threatened during ex parte communications.108 Echoing the principles
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of the PCA Optional Rules, Bazil Oglinda, an arbitrator for the International Chamber of
Commerce and the Romanian Chamber of Commerce, described impartiality as “the
watchword of all tribunals, including arbitrators.”109 Even though parties appoint
arbitrators that would serve the selector’s interests, the barrier between counsel and
impartial arbitrators should remain standing.110 Once the barrier is torn down, many
arbitration rules would permit vacatur of the arbitral award; therefore, the maintenance of
arbitrator impartiality and independence, as well as procedural fairness to the parties, hold
a high position of importance in arbitration.111 Analyzing multiple arbitration laws,
scholars commented on the behavior of the arbitrators and its impacts on the equal
treatment of the parties, such as in the United States, where the courts apply the Federal
Arbitration Act’s “evident partiality” standard if the arbitrators have shown “corrupt”
behavior or where the courts analyze whether the challenged arbitrator acted “in bad faith”
to “deprive [a] party of a fundamentally fair proceeding.”112 Thus, arbitrator impartiality
and procedural fairness are inextricably linked with dispute resolution.
In particular, Ms. Carita Wallgren-Lindholm, a member of the ICC International
Court of Arbitration, and Mr. James Carter, a U.S. arbitrator with a great understanding of
the ICC, LCIA, AAA, and ICSID, considered the role of an arbitrator and the
impermissibility of ex parte communications, which damage procedural fairness.113
and Symmetry in the Hearing Room (or Not), in STORIES FROM THE HEARING ROOM: EXPERIENCE FROM
ARBITRAL PRACTICE 195 (Domitille Baizeau & Bernd Ehle eds., 2015); James Carter, The Rights and Duties
of the Arbitrator: Six Aspects of the Rule of Reasonableness, in THE STATUS OF THE ARBITRATOR 24 (ICC
Pub. No. 564, 1995); Alfonso Gomez-Acebo, The Standard of Impartiality and Independence, in 34 PARTYAPPOINTED ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
LAW LIBRARY 69, 79 (2016).
Oglinda, supra note 108, at 127 (citing Amec Civil Eng’g Ltd. v. Sec’y of St. for Transp. [2004] EWHC
2339 (TCC)).
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Commenting from the perspective of a modern arbitrator, Wallgren-Lindholm wrote that
arbitrators should prevent any party attempts at ex parte communications.114 She reasoned
that ex parte communications with the arbitrator could lead to an “inappropriate flow of
information or misdirected intentions.”115 Next, referring to the American Code of Ethics,
Carter enumerated the six canons of arbitrator ethics.116 For instance, the arbitrator must
“avoid [the] appearance of impropriety” and “be faithful to the relationship of trust and
confidentiality inherent in that office.”117 Clarifying the latter canon, Carter explained that
the arbitrator cannot make use of discovered information “to affect adversely the interest
of others,” which could likely include information gained in ex parte discussions.118
Wallgren-Lindholm’s and Carter’s analyses reflect the international opinion against ex
parte communications; since parties agree to arbitration on the basis of trust for the process,
arbitrators are obliged to maintain the parties’ trust in a fair and impartial manner.119
In addition, the impartiality and procedural fairness of arbitrators are often
compared to that of judges.120 Alfonso Gomez-Acebo, the co-head of the International
Arbitration Group at Baker McKenzie, described three requirements of an impartial and
independent arbitrator.121 Namely, the arbitrator must: (1) have an “unbiased mind,” which
is “not different” from a judge; (2) have an “unbiased behavior”; and (3) keep “a minimum
distance” from the parties.122 Other scholars equate an arbitrator to a judge where practicing
impartiality and procedural fairness is essential.123 Thus, the arbitrator has the obligation

114

Wallgren-Lindholm, supra note 108, at 198 (clarifying that if the contracting parties attempt to
communicate with an arbitrator outside of the arbitral proceedings and without the permission of the opposing
party, the arbitrator must deny the party’s outside contact, adding that “such ex parte contact is not allowed
in international arbitral proceedings and should not occur anew”).
115

Id.

116

Carter, supra note 108, at 24.

117

See id. at 25 (emphasis added).

118

Id.

119

Wallgren-Lindholm, supra note 108, at 198; Carter, supra note 108, at 25.

120

Gomez-Acebo, supra note 108, at 79.

121

Id.

See id. at 80-87 (regarding unbiased behavior as “the tribunal’s obligation to conduct the procedure
impartially, allowing all of the parties to have a reasonable opportunity to present their case” and describing
“minimum distance” as lack of “favouritism”).
122

Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Arbitrator: One Man-Three Roles – Some Independent Comments on the
Ethical and Legal Obligations of an Arbitrator, 5 J. INT’L ARB. 7, 8 (1988) (separating the arbitrator in three
categories: (1) an arbitrator as a common law judge; (2) an arbitrator as a judge selected by the parties; and
(3) an arbitrator as a catalyzer to the negotiated rules between the parties).
123

to act in a way that would grant the parties “a fair and public hearing.”124 The comparison
of arbitrators with judges explains the arbitrator’s “quasi-judicial” role, in which the
arbitrator must deliver a “faithful, honest and disinterested” analysis of the proceedings.125
Therefore, just like a judge, the arbitrator acts as a counterbalance of fairness between the
arbitrating parties.126 Because the arbitrator as adjudicator adopts the role of the judge, the
arbitrator supports the framework of arbitration, which includes the enforcement of the
parties’ agreement to resolve all disputes fairly and impartially via the arbitral process.127
4. Impartiality and Procedural Fairness in National Arbitration Laws and
Arbitration Rules
Fourth, in addition to the arbitral laws of Slovenia and Croatia, other national
arbitration laws and rules emphasize the importance of impartiality and procedural
fairness.128 For example, the arbitration law of Austria regards the principles of “fair
treatment of the parties” and due process as “general principles,” which are essential to the
character of the arbitral proceedings; therefore, the parties cannot waive these
protections.129 The Austrian arbitral laws are thus comparable to principles of a judge’s
impartiality and equal treatment of the parties in litigation.130 The English Arbitration Act
of 1996 lists impartiality of the tribunal as both an “object of arbitration” and a general
principle; in addition, the tribunal must “act fairly and impartially as between the
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parties.”131 Therefore, the arbitral laws of Slovenia and Croatia are not unique in describing
the standards for arbitrator impartiality.
Arbitration rules, including those from London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA), the American Arbitration Association (AAA), and the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, require that the arbitrators be “strictly impartial,” and, as a corollary, the rules forbid
any ex parte communications between party members and arbitrators.132 In addition,
institutional rules from other parts of the globe contain provisions similar to the PCA, such
as the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, Singapore International Arbitration
Centre, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Vienna International Arbitration
Centre, and International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution.133 As a result,
virtually all national arbitration laws and institutional rules value impartiality of the arbitral
tribunal and procedural fairness toward the parties; if arbitrators favor one of the parties in
a partial manner, the arbitral proceedings could become tainted.134
5. Codes of Ethics
Fifth, arbitral codes of ethics have increasingly won acceptance in international
arbitration, and they reinforce the necessity of impartiality in arbitration.135 In international
practice, arbitrators hold a high regard for the implementation of the IBA Guidelines on
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration.136 According to General Standard 1 of the
IBA Guidelines, the arbitrator must act in an impartial and independent way, which is

131

Arbitration
Act
1996,
c.
23
(Eng.),
art.
1,
33,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/pdfs/ukpga_19960023_en.pdf (“The tribunal shall comply
with that general duty in conducting the arbitral proceedings.”) (emphasis added).
132

Rita Davis & Allan B. Moore, An American Abroad: The Divergent Worlds of U.S. and U.K. Insurance
Arbitrations, 29-1 MEALEY’S INTL. ARB. REP. 26 (2014); see also London Court of International Arbitration,
Arbitration Rules, art. 14.4(i) (2014) (requiring the members of the Tribunal “to act fairly and impartially . .
. giving [each party] a reasonable opportunity of putting its case and dealing with that of its opponent(s)”);
American Arbitration Association, Arbitration Rules, art. 20 (2014); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules art. 17(1)
(2010) (requiring the Tribunal to resolve the parties’ disputes in a “fair and efficient” manner).
133

Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, Arbitration Rules, art. 11.1 (2013); Singapore International
Arbitration Centre, Arbitration Rules, art. 13.1, 13.6 (2016); Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services,
Arbitration Rules, art. 9.1, 13.3 (2014); Vienna International Arbitration Centre, Arbitration Rules, art. 16.2
(2013); International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Arbitration Rules, art. 5.4, 7.1 (2014).
134

Davis, supra note 132.

135

See generally IBA Council, IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, at 2 (Oct.
23,
2014),
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=e2fe5e72-eb14-4bba-b10dd33dafee8918 (representing “best international practice” regarding the impartiality of the arbitrators).
136

Id.

described as a “fundamental principle.”137 Lawrence Newman and David Zaslowsky
described Articles 5.3 and 5.4 of the IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators,
which forbid “unilateral communications” and require arbitrators to inform the other party
or arbitrators of any “improper communication[s].”138 The Guidelines reflect the “more
commonly expressed European claim that international arbitration practices are that party
appointed arbitrators are completely neutral,” even though party appointed arbitrators may
provide better clarification of the selecting party’s arguments to the rest of the Tribunal.139
Therefore, the IBA Guidelines and Rules of Ethics discourage the arbitrators from
engaging in ex parte proceedings, and they echo the growing international consensus on
arbitrator impartiality and independence.140
6. Impartiality and Procedural Fairness in Arbitral Decisions
Furthermore, arbitral decisions show the importance of impartiality of the
arbitrators and procedural fairness. In particular, one unpublished ICC decision focused on
the behavior of an arbitrator, who was “an acting judge” and had access to information that
other members of the tribunal did not possess.141 Because personal and unequal access to
information led to questions about the arbitrator’s impartiality, the ICC Court did not
“confirm [the arbitrator] on ‘grounds of [his] past.’”142 Thus, arbitrators must base their
decisions on the arguments and evidence presented by both parties, instead of relying on
ex parte sources.
In the unpublished case, ICC Case 12171, a maritime arbitral proceeding between
the claimant, a Croatian shipyard, and the respondent, a German company, the ICC Court
held that the award was “non-binding upon the parties” since the German respondent
engaged in ex parte communications with the expert arbitrator.143 In its decision, the ICC
Court first commented on the lack of impartiality and independence of the expert
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arbitrator.144 Namely, the arbitrator “had discussions with [Respondent] about the [arbitral]
procedure” and believed that he was “very close to Respondent”; the arbitrator was not in
contact with the claimant, and the claimant was unaware of the ex parte communications
between the arbitrator and the respondent.145 However, unlike the current conflict between
Croatia and Slovenia, the Court was unsure if the expert arbitrator’s affinity for the German
respondent affected the expert arbitrator’s impartiality and independence.146 Nevertheless,
the Court analyzed whether the arbitrator violated the Croatian claimant’s right of equal
treatment and procedural fairness.147 Similar to the current dispute regarding the Bay of
Piran/Savudrija, the arbitrator was twice engaged in secret ex parte communications with
the German respondent, and as a result, the claimant was not able to provide the arbitrator
with its own documents to support the Croatian argument and counter the German
position.148 The ICC case was significant because the Court heavily considered various
factors in annulling an award, including the impartiality and independence of the arbitrator,
as well as the right of the parties to be heard.149 Although a sole arbitrator settled the
Croatian-German dispute, the ICC Court did not make a distinction between a sole
arbitrator and a party-appointed arbitrator; thus, the ICC followed the increasing
international emphasis on discouraging any behavior that would compromise the
impartiality of the arbitrator, which would have otherwise led to an unfair decision.150
Moreover, the Buraimi Oasis case of 1955 between the United Kingdom and Saudi
Arabia illustrated that the violation of ex parte proceedings, if extensive, could lead not
only to an annulled award but also to abandoned arbitral proceedings.151 In Buraimi Oasis,
the Saudi party-appointed arbitrator, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, was often in contact with the
Saudi Arabian counsel.152 The Saudi government bribed multiple arbitrators to decide in
Saudi Arabia’s favor; in response, the arbitrators resigned from both sides until the process
was abandoned.153 Global Arbitration Review described that the ex parte proceedings and
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the replacement of biased arbitrators caused an “instigation of the tribunal.”154 The
violation of the ex parte rule in Buraimi Oasis countered Slovenia’s emphasis on the
Alabama Arbitration case of 1872, where U.S. agents and arbitrators were in constant,
extensive, yet acceptable contact with one another; however, the Alabama Arbitration’s
role was to show the value of parties selecting their own arbitrators.155 Alabama
Arbitration does not explicitly support the violation of ex parte restrictions, and the trend
in today’s institutional rules and national arbitration statutes supports the movement
towards greater arbitrator impartiality.156
Some arbitral decisions likewise implied the necessity of arbitrator impartiality in
carrying out the arbitration agreement. For example, in Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, the
International Court of Justice described two major goals of state-to-state arbitration: (1) to
“entrust an arbitral tribunal with the task of settling a dispute in accordance with the terms
agreed by the parties”; and (2) to settle all disputes “peaceful[ly] and [definitely] . . . that
had theretofore been incapable of amicable resolution.”157 Arbitration, therefore, requires
trust in the arbitrators to deliver an award in compliance with the arbitration agreement,
and the proceedings must be carried out fairly and amicably; without fair and amicable
proceedings, the parties would have very likely not opted to settle their disputes via
arbitration.158
7. Procedural Fairness in Case Law
Case law likewise stresses the need for procedural fairness in arbitration. The court
in Pochat, a U.S. decision, held that an arbitrator’s misconduct in the admission of evidence
could lead to annulment of the award; in particular, the court analyzed as a factor whether
the arbitrator’s decision to admit particular evidence was “so gross as to deprive the party
of a fundamentally fair proceeding. . . .”159 The court’s emphasis on procedural fairness
corresponds to the important attributes of arbitration.160 Taking procedural fairness one
step further in the area of ex parte communications, Gary Born stated that “undisclosed ex
parte contacts concerning the merits of the parties’ dispute are presumptively regarded as
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improper.”161 To support this claim, Born cited United Food, where an arbitral award was
challenged due to an arbitrator’s involvement in ex parte communications; namely, the
arbitrator made use of the information gained in these discussions.162 Various cases such
as United Food, however, illustrate that the complainant must show more than the mere
existence of ex parte communications to annul an award or the proceedings, such as
presenting evidence of the communications’ effect on procedural fairness or proving the
breach of the object and purpose of the arbitration agreement.163
8. Parties’ Obligations
Lastly, the arbitrating parties likewise hold specific obligations, including the
requirement to act in good faith.164 Applicable to arbitration agreements, Article 26 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties holds that arbitration agreements are “binding
upon the parties,” and such agreements “must be performed [by the parties] in good
faith.”165 The concept of good faith is central in international relations, as stated by the
commentary to the Vienna Convention.166 The commentary cited several arbitral decisions
which required the parties to act in good faith, such as in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries
proceedings.167 The good faith-spirit of Article 26 of the Vienna Convention is present in
Article 10(1) of the Arbitration Agreement between Slovenia and Croatia, which forbids
either party from “intensify[ing] the dispute or jeopardiz[ing] the work of the Arbitral
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Tribunal.”168 In sum, the requirement of good faith among the parties plays a key role in
settling the Bay dispute under the “principles of international law” and “good neighbourly
relations.”169 Articles 4 and 10(1) of the Arbitration Agreement, taken together, emphasize
good faith by all actors in the arbitral process; therefore, the acts of individual parties
cannot purposely undermine the goals of arbitration, an adjudicative process. 170 If only
arbitrators were required to act in good faith and to carry out the arbitration agreement,
parties could likely be encouraged to adopt underhanded tactics to receive an unfair
advantage in the arbitral proceedings; it thus follows that the parties have similar
obligations to act in good faith.171
If the arbitral proceedings do not follow the principles of impartiality,
independence, and procedural fairness, the arbitral institution would likewise feel the
negative impacts of the ethical violations.172 When the arbitrator’s sense of independence
and impartiality is not trusted, then the parties’ faith in the arbitral proceedings could be
jeopardized “in an ir[r]eparable way.”173 Thus, the behavior of the arbitrators and the
parties can have a significant impact on the arbitral proceedings and ultimately, the
result.174 With a tainted arbitral proceeding, arbitration ceases to function as an acceptable
method of amicably settling the parties’ disputes in particular institutions, thus increasing
the risk of an annulled award or of rescinded arbitration agreements.175 Therefore, tainted
ex parte communications clash with the integrity of arbitral institutions, as well as with
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arbitrator impartiality and procedural fairness, two vital elements of state-to-state
arbitration.176
IV.
THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL’S PARTIAL AWARD AS MUDDIED
PROCEEDINGS

BY THE

DEFILED

The Arbitral Tribunal in Croatia v. Slovenia erred in continuing the arbitral
proceedings, notwithstanding Croatia’s unilateral rescission of the Arbitration Agreement.
Four issues in the case muddied the Tribunal’s decision. First, the Tribunal did not place
much emphasis on the purpose of the Arbitration Agreement to settle the Bay dispute in
regard to the “principles of international law” and “good neighbourly relations.”177 Second,
the Tribunal understated the impact of the ex parte communications on the fairness of the
arbitral proceedings.178 Third, the replacement of the party-appointed arbitrators could not
have remedied the issue regarding Slovenia’s access to information on the arbitral
proceedings and the Tribunal’s new knowledge of the case information.179 Finally,
Slovenia’s behavior during the proceedings violated the good-faith requirement of both the
Vienna Convention and the Arbitration Agreement.180
1. The Purpose of the Arbitration Agreement
First, the Arbitral Tribunal incorrectly claimed that the purpose and main goal of
the arbitral proceedings between Slovenia and Croatia were not “defeated” and that the
arbitral proceedings could continue in the absence of Croatian counsel.181 Although Article
65 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties invokes a presumption of validity of
treaties (including arbitration agreements), Article 60 of the Vienna Convention permits a
party to revoke the arbitration agreement if the breach of the agreement was “material.”182
Arbitration Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 4(b) (requiring the Tribunal to reach a “fair and just result”
in the Bay dispute).
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For a breach to be “material,” the act must be a “violation of a provision essential to the
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the [arbitration agreement].”183 For instance,
the Nicaragua case in the I.C.J. held that an act that “undermines the whole spirit of the
agreement” is likewise a material violation of the arbitration agreement.184 The Convention
reflects the spirit and the intent of the parties to arbitrate.185
According to the purpose of the Arbitration Agreement, which is explained in
Article 4(b), the Arbitral Tribunal must apply “international law, equity, and the principle
of good neighbourly relations” in fairly resolving the Bay dispute between the parties.186
The PCA Optional Rules’ provisions on arbitrator impartiality and case law also shape the
purpose of an arbitration agreement.187 The Tribunal correctly stated that in Guinea-Bissau
v. Senegal, an I.C.J. case, the purpose of an arbitration agreement is “to entrust an
arbitration tribunal with the task of settling a dispute in accordance with the terms agreed
by the parties, who define in the agreement the jurisdiction of the tribunal and determine
its limits” and to reach a “peaceful and definitive settlement of a dispute that had
theretofore been incapable of amicable resolution.”188 However, the current Tribunal
placed too much weight on finality as the main goal of arbitration, for there was virtually
no consideration of arbitrator impartiality and procedural fairness in framing the goals.189
As explained by the Reporters to the U.S. Restatement (Third) and other scholars,
arbitration serves an adjudicatory function, which includes the impartiality and
independence of arbitrators, as well as procedural fairness.190 The adjudicatory decisions
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of arbitrators are based on the evidence and legal arguments of the parties during the
arbitral proceedings, not on ex parte communications, which take place outside of the
arbitral proceedings.191 Since ex parte communications conflict with the purpose of the
current Arbitration Agreement, which includes resolving disputes in accordance with
arbitrator impartiality and procedural fairness, Slovenia’s act did constitute a material
breach of the Arbitration Agreement. Because there was “hesitation” that the current
arbitral process could solve the Bay dispute in an impartial and fair manner, the Arbitration
Agreement could have been rendered null and void.192 Taken together, the Arbitration
Agreement should have been rescinded under Article 60(1) of the Vienna Convention,
contrary to the Tribunal’s contention.193
Furthermore, the Tribunal correctly recognized Croatia’s admission to the
European Union as the quid pro quo of the Arbitration Agreement.194 However, this EU“nexus” could not justify Slovenia’s unhampered use of ex parte communications to distort
the arbitral proceedings and violate the constituent goals of arbitration.195 In the Partial
Award, the Tribunal held that “the [Arbitration] Agreement was negotiated with the full
support of the European Union. . . .”196 The support from the European Union did not mean
that arbitration was to be sole method of resolving the Bay dispute.197 In a September 2015
article, the European Commission (EC) supported the negotiations to arbitrate, “which
[was] in the interest of the legal security for both parties. . . .”198 However, the EC left open
the possibility of non-arbitral cooperation; therefore, the European Union’s nexus to the
Arbitration Agreement is not as strong as the Tribunal described it.199 Slovenia’s contention
that Croatia’s rescission of the Arbitration Agreement would jeopardize “the essential quid
pro quo of the Parties’ agreement, [such as Croatia’s accession to the European Union]” is

entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.”).
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therefore inaccurate.200 In addition, the Tribunal has not shown that the goal of EU
membership was a better reflection of the “whole spirit of the Agreement” than arbitrator
impartiality and procedural fairness; rather, the Tribunal has only shown that there was a
supposed “nexus” between EU membership and binding dispute resolution, which does not
erase the adjudicative function of arbitration.201 The quid pro quo of arbitration, Croatia’s
admission to the EU, cannot contradict the purpose of the Arbitration Agreement, which is
to settle all disputes in an impartial and procedurally fair manner.202 As a result, Slovenia’s
ex parte communications were a material breach under Article 60 of the Vienna
Convention.
2. Ex Parte Communications’ Impact on the Arbitral Proceedings
Second, the Tribunal understated the impact of Slovenia’s ex parte communications
on the arbitral proceedings.203 According to the Tribunal, Arbitrator Sekolec only presented
two documents to the Tribunal and subsequently to the parties.204 As common arbitral
practice, Sekolec wrote “personal and confidential notes regarding the border on or around
Dragonja,” which “summarise[d] his point of view.”205 Next, Sekolec presented a
collection of documents to the Registry of the Tribunal; however, the Registry created its
own official index of documents without the assistance of Sekolec’s submissions.206
Because the two official documents supposedly contained no new information about the
Bay dispute, the Tribunal incorrectly held that the ex parte communications did not affect
the “procedural balance” of the arbitral proceedings, contrary to Croatia’s objections.207
Even if the documents introduced by Sekolec did not contribute new information, the ex
parte communications did not solely impact the type of documents that were admitted in
the proceedings.208
Although the Tribunal recognized that Sekolec only submitted two documents,
Croatia reasonably feared that Slovenia’s ex parte communications affected the course of
200
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arbitration beyond the submission of two documents. Further, Croatia feared that the mere
substitution of Sekolec and Vukas as party-appointed arbitrators would not alleviate the
issue.209 Due to the potential widespread effect of the discussions between Sekolec and
Drenik, Croatia “could no longer determine” the exact, negative contributions of the ex
parte communications to the arbitral proceeding.210 The discovered transcripts from 20142015 show that Drenik discussed with Sekolec: (a) possible strategies on ways to persuade
the arbitrators both during and outside of arbitral proceedings; and (b) the exchange of
Slovenian documents under Sekolec’s name.211 In particular, Drenik suggested that
Sekolec introduce new documents as if he were the author of the documents, and Drenik
likewise suggested multiple arguments and scenarios that Sekolec could make while dining
with the arbitrators, such as with Bruno Simma.212
Although arbitrators may discuss arbitral issues with one another outside of the
proceedings, the conflict lies in the fact that the Slovenian counsel was attempting to
unfairly influence the non-party appointed arbitrators by introducing new arguments,
perspectives, and evidence without the presence of Croatian counsel.213 The role of a partyappointed arbitrator is to help the Tribunal better understand the position of the party who
selected that arbitrator, not to act as a secret mouthpiece to sway the Tribunal.214 Thus, ex
parte communications do not exclusively affect the validity of documents presented by a
party-appointed arbitrator, as the Tribunal seemed to suggest, but they could also
substantively and prejudicially affect the Tribunal’s understanding of the dispute through
a Slovenian lens without the presence of opposing counsel, Croatia.215 The altered
understanding of the dispute could subsequently have an impact on the official record of
the arbitration.216 Even without Sekolec’s and Vukas’ involvement in the Tribunal, the rest
of the Tribunal would still retain knowledge of Sekolec’s – and ultimately the Slovenian
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counsel’s – ex parte arguments, thus compromising the impartiality of the arbitrators and
placing Croatia at a procedural disadvantage.
3. The Replacement of the Party-Appointed Arbitrators
Furthermore, Croatia reasonably feared that the Slovenian counsel had “informal”
access to information discussed by the Tribunal, which weakens the Tribunal’s position
that “an impartial and independent decision-making process can be guaranteed.”217 In
January and April 2015, coinciding with the time when the ex parte communications
between Sekolec and Slovenian counsel began, Mr. Erjavec, the Foreign Minister of
Slovenia, claimed that he possessed “an informal channel of communication with the
tribunal.”218 In addition, Erjavec described in an interview that the Tribunal would rule in
favor of Slovenia’s interpretation of the Bay ownership.219 The comments reflect the
possible exchange of information between the Slovenian counsel and Sekolec, which is a
violation of Article 10(1) of the Arbitration Agreement.220 Therefore, Erjavec’s interview
showed the extent to which Slovenia was capable of influencing the results of the
arbitration via Sekolec’s ex parte involvement.221 Therefore, even if Sekolec and Vukas
were replaced as arbitrators, as the Tribunal ordered, the Slovenian counsel would have
still retained access to the information gained by the “informal channel of communication,”
such as the arbitrators’ viewpoints on certain facts or arguments.222 The “channel” works
both ways; namely, the remaining members of the Tribunal would nevertheless mentally
retain any form of ex parte information or strategies conveyed by Sekolec’s meetings with
the individual arbitrators.223 Such access to the Tribunal weakens the purpose of arbitration,
which is to settle all disputes in an adjudicative and impartial manner.224
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4. Violation of the Good-Faith Requirement under the Vienna Convention
Fourth, contrary to the Tribunal’s reasoning that Slovenia’s ex parte
communications did not “render the continuation of the proceedings impossible” under
Article 60(1) of the Vienna Convention, Slovenia’s behavior violated the good-faith
requirement under the Arbitration Agreement and resultantly devalued the purpose of
arbitration.225 Parties must conduct themselves in good faith during arbitral proceedings
and negotiations.226 Following the principle of “pacta sunt servanda,” Article 26 of the
Vienna Convention requires the parties to comply with arbitration agreements in good
faith.227 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention played an important role in the GabčikovoNagymaros Project case, in which the I.C.J. requested the Hungarian and Slovakian parties
“to find an agreed solution that takes into account the objectives of the Treaty, which must
be pursued in a joint and integrated way. . . .”228 The Court in Gabčikovo also held that the
purpose of a treaty and the requirement of good faith are one and the same; the concept of
good faith implies that the parties would implement the arbitration agreement “in a
reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realized.”229 The rationale in
Gabčikovo is reflected in the current Arbitration Agreement, where the parties were
expected to maintain “good neighbourly relations” by not interfering with the Tribunal’s
mandate.230 Thus, the behavior of the parties was tightly knit with the purpose of the
Arbitration Agreement.231
Here, Slovenia failed to act in good faith, which frustrated the Arbitration
Agreement’s purpose. Thus, Croatia reasonably lost faith in the current arbitral process to
such an extent as to rescind the Arbitration Agreement.232 Although Slovenia agreed that
the Arbitral Tribunal would apply the “principle of good neighbourly relations” to the
225
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dispute, Slovenia engaged in extended ex parte communications with Sekolec without
Croatia’s knowledge, and the ex parte communications likely affected the impartiality of
the whole Tribunal and procedural fairness negatively.233 In addition, Erjavec possessed an
“informal channel of communication” with the Tribunal, which strengthened the suspicion
of unfair dealings.234 Although Croatia uncovered the transcripts between Sekolec and
Drenik, Slovenia continued to claim that Croatia, as a new EU member, was bound to the
Arbitration Agreement.235 Despite the EU’s recognition of other methods to decide the Bay
dispute, Slovenia continues to demand that Croatia be subject to the decisions of the
Tribunal, whose judgment was tampered with in favor of Slovenia.236 Slovenia’s ex parte
discussions did not symbolize good faith or “good neighbourly relations.”237 Contrary to
the Tribunal’s holding, Slovenia’s actions undermined the goal of the Arbitration
Agreement, and since there was “hesitation” of fulfilling the good-faith goals of arbitration,
the Tribunal should have annulled the arbitral proceedings.238
V. FEAR OF EXPANDED GROUNDS FOR THE RESCISSION OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
Despite Slovenia’s contention that the purpose of the arbitral proceedings was “to
settle the dispute submitted to it” and to issue a final award, the ex parte communications
“contaminated” the proceedings, as Croatia argued.239 Thus, Croatia’s loss of faith in the
arbitral proceedings and the defiling of the arbitral proceedings should have led to the
unilateral rescission of the Arbitration Agreement.240 However, one of the sought-after
benefits of arbitration is its binding and expeditious character.241 Normally, parties may

Croatia v. Slovenia, supra note 1, at 43-44 (citing Section 9.1 of the Terms of Appointment, where “[t]he
Parties shall not engage in any oral or written communications with any member of the Arbitral Tribunal ex
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not unilaterally declare arbitration agreements void, except in very rare circumstances. 242
In most situations, the arbitral tribunal would decide on its jurisdiction through the doctrine
of kompetenz-kompetenz, where the tribunal would determine whether an agreement to
arbitrate exists or is valid.243
Slovenia’s contention that the purpose of the arbitral proceedings was “to settle the
dispute submitted to it” would seem to contradict with Croatia’s demand to end the arbitral
proceedings.244 One might fear that if all arbitrating parties were to challenge the existence
of the arbitration agreement due to arbitrator partiality, procedural unfairness, or ex parte
communications, the binding characteristics of arbitration would gradually fade away.245
According to ICAO Council, “all such [arbitration] clauses would become potentially a
dead letter” if parties would continue to challenge the arbitration agreement’s existence.246
Likewise, the expeditiousness of arbitration would fall under attack, for challenges to the
arbitration agreement would slow down the arbitral process.247
However, if Croatia successfully rescinded the Arbitration Agreement, the decision
would not set a dangerous precedent. Rather, the decision to terminate the arbitration
agreement would be based on material violations of the agreement’s purpose, which the
transcripts of the ex parte communications extensively revealed. If the rescinding party
cannot prove such material violations, the courts should not recognize the unilateral
termination of the arbitration agreement. The idea echoed here is not new; it is already
reflected in both Articles 60(1) and 31(1) the Vienna Convention, which requires the
interpretation of and compliance with a treaty (in this case, an arbitration agreement) with
regard to “its object and purpose.”248
The heavy burden of proof of rescinding an arbitration agreement under Article
60(1) of the Vienna Convention, therefore, would fall on rescinding parties, such as
Croatia.249 A claim that the opposing party was engaged in ex parte communications with
its appointed arbitrator would not be sufficient in itself to render the arbitration agreement
ICAO Council, 1972 I.C.J. at 53, ¶ 16 (“[A] merely unilateral suspension per se [cannot] render
jurisdictional clauses inoperative. . . .”).
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void.250 On the other hand, if the ex parte communications would lead to a “defect[ed]”
arbitral system, the arbitration agreement’s purpose to settle all disputes in a fair and
impartial manner would fail.251 The cases the Tribunal cited support this rationale, such as
in Victor Pey Casado, where the arbitral tribunal replaced a party-appointed arbitrator upon
discovering the exchange of a drafted tribunal decision with its appointing party; here, the
exchange of a single document was not enough to defile the arbitral system.252 However,
if the rescinding party could extensively show that the ex parte discussions both: (1)
violated the main purpose of the arbitration agreement; and (2) tainted the process of
arbitration, the party could likely rescind the arbitration agreement.
Even though ex parte communications contravene both the adjudicative nature of
arbitration and the requirement that parties settle their disputes on the basis of
“international law, equity, and the principle of good neighbourly relations,” which are the
main purposes of the arbitration between Slovenia and Croatia, the rescinding party must
additionally show that the ex parte transgression had a negative impact on the arbitral
process.253 Without demonstrating this, the defect could be cured by simply replacing the
party-appointed arbitrators and counsel members engaged in ex parte communications and
restarting the proceedings, as the current Tribunal decided.254 The current arbitral dispute,
however, is sui generis; rarely would the rescinding party discover the transcripts and
contents of the ex parte communications, as well as multiple statements from the Slovenian
government regarding its opinions of and involvement with the arbitral proceedings.255
Unlike in Victor Pey Casado, Croatia was not concerned with one document that
summarized the Tribunal’s rationale of the proceedings after careful consideration of all
facts and arguments presented by both parties.256 Instead, through the transcripts and
Erjavec’s public comments, the Croatian counsel saw that ex parte communications
provided a means for the Slovenian counsel to gain access to and extensively affect the
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thought process of the Tribunal in a thirteen-month period without Croatia’s knowledge,
such as by considering new oral or written evidence, attaching different weights to
particular arguments in ways that might not be reflected in the Tribunal’s official report,
and granting strategical insight to the Slovenian counsel as to how the Tribunal might in
the future react to particular arguments.257
Thus, the evidence that Croatia provided must have also shown that the arbitral
process had been comprehensively affected unfairly in favor of Slovenia to stipulate that
the task of the Tribunal had been rendered impossible to fulfill.258 Since in very few
situations could parties successfully prove that the ex parte discussions both violated the
purpose of the arbitration agreement and defiled the arbitral proceedings, the editor’s
disagreement with the Tribunal’s decision would not lead to more frivolous challenges to
the agreements to arbitrate.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Croatia v. Slovenia dispute brought to light the conflict between major tenets
of state-to-state arbitration, including finality over a border dispute that arose after the fall
of Yugoslavia and procedural fairness in the arbitral proceedings. The Arbitral Tribunal’s
analysis raised an important question regarding arbitration’s ability to resolve longstanding disputes in an adjudicative manner: at what point must the binding character of
arbitration give way to the integrity of the proceedings? In most cases, rules of arbitral
institutions assume that both finality and impartiality can be achieved. However, in
conflicts where both parties have much at stake, parties may turn to strategies that could
compromise the integrity of the arbitral proceedings, such as through ex parte
communications. If arbitrator impartiality and procedural fairness in reaching a binding
decision were cast out as the main goals of arbitration, arbitration would be seen as a
repressive tool to reach a particular result by any means necessary. The punishment for ex
parte communications or any other attempt to influence the Tribunal, such as by replacing
the arbitrators, would be relatively slight when one looks at the sought-after award: access
to the Bay. Croatia v. Slovenia will serve as a landmark case for future disputes dealing
with ex parte communications and arbitrator impartiality. Arbitral tribunals will need to
avoid any actions by the parties that could potentially defile the arbitral proceedings.
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